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The combination of personal protective equipment (PPE) together with donning and
doffing protocols was designed to protect British and Canadian military medical personnel
in the Kerry Town Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU) in Sierra Leone. The PPE solution was
selected to protect medical staff from infectious risks, notably Ebola virus, and chemical
(hypochlorite) exposure. PPE maximized dexterity, enabled personnel to work in hot
temperatures for periods of up to 2 h, protected mucosal membranes when doffing outer
layers, and minimized potential contamination of the doffing area with infectious material
by reducing the requirement to spray PPE with hypochlorite.
The ETU was equipped to allow medical personnel to provide a higher level of care than
witnessed in many existing ETUs. This assured personnel working as part of the interna-
tional response that they would receive as close to Western treatment standards as possible
if they were to contract Ebola virus disease (EVD). PPE also enabled clinical interventions
that are not seen routinely in West African EVD treatment regimens, whilst providing a
robust protective barrier. Competency in using PPE was developed during a nine-day pre-
deployment training programme. This allowed over 60 clinical personnel per deployment to
practice skills in PPE in a simulated ETU and in classrooms. Overall, the training provided:
(i) an evidence base underpinning the PPE solution chosen; (ii) skills in donning and doffing
of PPE; (iii) personnel confidence in the selected PPE; and (iv) quantifiable testing of each
individual’s capability to don PPE, perform tasks and doff PPE safely.
ª 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).irectorate, ICT Centre,
15 2SQ, UK. Tel.: þ44
(P. Reidy).
Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Ebola virus is found in body fluids such as blood, sweat,
vomit and diarrhoea of patients in the acute phase of infection
[1]. Contact with patients presents a high risk of nosocomial
infection to the medical staff involved with their treatment. InHealthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
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zation declared the West African outbreak to be an interna-
tional public health emergency, through to November 2015,
881 healthcare workers (HCWs) contracted Ebola virus disease
(EVD), 531 of whom died [2].
Serious gaps in implementing infection prevention and
control (IPC) standards were reported in the settings where
transmission likely took place or where infected HCWs were
employed. Among these, the most frequently reported were
deficiencies in administrative, engineering and environmental
controls, inappropriate use or lack of personal protective
equipment (PPE), defective IPC practice and behaviour, and
poor employment conditions and social determinants [3].
Recent studies have also shown that the baseline skill levels of
HCWs in PPE removal are poor, and result in contamination and
risk to HCWs [4,5].
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) Kerry Town Ebola Treatment
Unit (ETU) was developed to provide the highest possible
standards of care, including interventions such as peripheral
and central venous catheters, urinary catheters and blood
product transfusions. During the period from admission of the
first patient in November 2014 to discharge of the last patient
in December 2015, the unit admitted 125 patients, 44 of whom
had a final diagnosis of EVD. It was important that IPC standard
precautions were maintained to reduce the risk of healthcare-
associated infections for medical staff and patients.Rationale for selecting PPE
In September 2014, specialists from Public Health England,
the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and the Ministry of
Defence (MoD) worked together to identify the combination of
PPE and donning and doffing protocols for PPE worn by military
medical personnel working in a 12-bedded ETU in Kerry Town,
Sierra Leone. PPE comprised both single-use and re-usable
items. It needed to be available in a variety of sizes; to be
resistant to heat, sweat and chemicals; to minimise loss of
dexterity; and to maximize movement. Furthermore, the items
needed to be procured during a time when many countries
were seeking to stockpile PPE, making development of a sus-
tainable solution critical to allow for continuity and the
establishment of reliable supply.
The rationale behind the PPE solution was to allow for care
to be delivered whilst protecting those working within the ETU,
providing a barrier against nosocomial infection.
PPE was doffed in a designated area, prior to exit into the
green zone [6]. A buddyebuddy system where personnel were
consistently partnered with the same individual was estab-
lished. Personnel checked each other’s PPE and practices at
each stage of all activities from donning PPE, working in the red
zone (clinical), and doffing PPE to provide assurance during
clinical work.PPE selected
Scrubs
Cotton scrubs were chosen as the base layer. Consideration
was given to disposable scrubs but these were rejected on the
basis of comfort, material degradation and additional clinical
waste. Cotton scrubs offered a comfortable, absorbent basethat could be bleached, laundered and re-used. Due to the risk
of malaria, long-sleeved tops would have been preferred as
they offer greater protection against mosquito bites; however,
these proved to be significantly more difficult to source within
the time frames available.
Footwear
Rubber boots were chosen as the footwear for the clinical
zone as they are both chemical and ultraviolet resistant; the
boots needed to be decontaminated by soaking in hypochlorite
(5000 ppm) for at least 10min, rinsed in water and left inver-
ted, exposed to direct sunlight, before being transferred to the
green zone changing room for re-use. Rubber boots are flexible
and comfortable for wearers, and seamless boots were
preferred to aid decontamination. White or bright colours (not
red) were the preferred option as contamination could be seen
easily. The sole and upper area of the boot needed to be
resistant to both cuts and punctures. Furthermore, the sole
needed to meet EN13287 SRA and SATRA TM144 standards in
order to be slip resistant, whilst not having a deep tread which
could be difficult to decontaminate. Immersion foot can be
caused by wearing damp socks and shoes for less than one day
[7]. It was therefore decided that rubber boots would only be
worn within the red zone, and removed as soon as the staff
were decontaminated.
Coveralls
Despite the final choice of coverall suits, back fastening
gowns were initially considered as part of the overall PPE so-
lution due to their established use for infectious work. Gowns
can be removed away from the wearer and may assist with
temperature regulation in a warm environment. However, in
this circumstance, a continuous suit that extends to cover the
head, torso, arms and legs of the wearer was preferred. Cov-
eralls are produced to suit a variety of settings, and water-
resistant coveralls made of a breathable material with taped
seams were selected to reduce the possibility of liquid pene-
tration and contamination of exposed areas under the coverall.
The single-use coveralls chosen and tested were made of
polyethrine and polypreprine (both breathable materials).
These materials had a lower thermodynamic specification
compared with other PPE available on the market, which
potentially allowed for a longer working time in the red zone.
Coveralls with finger loops were selected as these anchored the
sleeve and prevented it from sliding up. Loops were worn on
the middle finger as this minimized loss of dexterity. Integrated
booties could potentially cause a trip hazard so were not
preferred.
Apron
Aprons were included within the PPE solution to increase
protection to the front of the wearer, as this area was
considered to be at high risk of splashes/spills of contaminated
material and, in addition, the coverall zip was set into
permeable material. The properties stipulated were: length
(below knee), plastic and lightweight design (minimum 16-mm
thickness, so it would stay in place but could be torn off
deliberately as part of the removal process), fluid repellent and
disposable. The apron chosen was adjustable, and so could
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helped to minimize heat stress whilst giving the necessary
protection. The recommendation was to change aprons and
gloves between patients in order to reduce the risk of cross-
contamination between patients.Gloves
From the outset, double gloving was the agreed standard
practice to allow outer gloves to be changed between patients
whilst still protecting the HCW. Tactility and dexterity through
two pairs of gloves was of key importance. In addition to
complying with European standard EN 374-2:2003 for resis-
tance to penetration by chemicals and micro-organisms,
avoidance of allergic reactions was considered from both a
patient and wearer perspective. These factors led to the
choice of 400-mm nitrile, powder-free gloves.These long gloves
gave additional coverage to the arm, coupled with a secure
elasticized coverall fitting around the wrist; this, together with
the coveralls’ attached finger loops, held the coverall cuffs in
place and minimized the risk of exposure of the hands, wrists
and lower arms. The first pair was worn under the cuff of the
coverall, with the second pair worn over the cuff and extending
up the arm. The guidance of the US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention [8] described the issues that may have been
faced if the gloves were taped to the sleeves of the coverall;
therefore, this practice was decided against in order to elimi-
nate these potential problems when doffing.Face mask and visor
The use of goggles was initially considered but, following
assessment of the environment and the level of care that would
be delivered, it was decided that goggles would be too
restrictive and the vision range would be too poor.
A disposable filtered face piece 2 (FFP2), non-valved mask
was selected to be worn under a face visor. Although the Ebola
virus is not spread via the airborne route, it was essential to
protect the eyes, mouths and noses of HCWs from droplets and
splashes. An FFP2 mask in combination with a full face visor
was considered to be sufficient to control the risk of fluid
splash. Non-valved or shrouded valve FFP2 masks were
preferred as these offer a greater level of protection from
splashes. The masks chosen were suitable for use in hot and
humid conditions, and were compatible with the face visors.
Additionally, the shape of the masks and the way they were
donned made the removal process safe.
Two types of multi-use adjustable visors were chosen as
these could fit the diversity of personnel deployed comfortably
and securely. Repeated decontamination of visors in high levels
of hypochlorite solution led to delamination and clouding of
the visors and rusting of metal supports, so both types of visors
had replaceable acetate screens and plastic adjustable head
pieces. After 10 min of soaking in 5000 ppm hypochlorite, the
visors were rinsed in water, dried and returned for re-use. The
visors provided good head movement and a greater vision
range, thereby increasing situational awareness. A clear full
face visor also meant that patients could see the clinician’s
face, allowing better communication and reassurance. Staff
reported that the visors reduced the feelings of claustro-
phobia, and allowed air movement and a cooling effect.Headwear
Two layers of disposable head wear were worn: a surgical
cap, to aid with coverage of the front of the head and prevent
hair falling in front of an individual’s eyes; and the hood of the
coverall suit. The hood of the coverall suit was worn over the
upper edge of the visor, allowing the hood to be removed prior
to the visor in the doffing stage, thus maintaining protection of
the mucosal membranes for longer during the doffing proced-
ure. Fluid-repellent caps were preferred; however, surgical
caps of several styles were found to be suitable. Most clinical
PPE were single-use items, apart from scrubs, face visors and
boots. Re-usable items were cleaned and decontaminated by
the wash team prior to re-use.
Procedural rationale
Donning and doffing
Personnel suffering from stress, fatigue, heat degradation
and dehydration are at a higher risk of making errors [9]. PPE
monitors were used to direct the doffing process. Their role
was to ensure that drills were carried out correctly, in a calm,
controlled manner, to assist doffers if required, manage doffing
errors and PPE breaches, and therefore minimize the risk of
contamination and stress to the individual.
Donning
The donning and doffing procedures were adapted from the
systems already in use, and were familiar to those used by
ambulance hazardous area response teams when wearing the
civilian responder (CR1) suit. Whilst this equipment was unfa-
miliar to military personnel, similar procedures are used with
the military Mark 1V chemical biological radiological and nu-
clear protection suit, and the training reflected this. A stepwise
approach (Figure 1) was developed to ensure that no items of
PPE were missed out, and allowed buddyebuddy checking of
integrity and fit.
Glove and apron changes between patients in the
red zone
Personnel decontaminated their gloves (with hypochlorite
solution 5000 ppm, using handwashing procedure) and then
changed their gloves and aprons between tasks and patients, as
per UK best practice [10,11] and military medical policy. This
was undertaken using the buddyebuddy system to ensure that
no steps were missed out and the correct sequence was
followed.
Doffing
The doffing procedure worked on a stepwise approach under
instruction from PPE monitors (Figure 2). This ensured minimal
risk of contamination to the wearer by reducing the chance of
contaminating lower layers of PPE and skin, and reducing
contamination of the environment by zoning the doffing area.
HCWs doffed in pairs so that they could see where they were
touching at all times. The order of removal maximized pro-
tection of mucosal membranes and minimized exposure to
1. Put on coverall and zip up chest; 
ensure flap covers the zip. Do not 
use adhesive zip flap but fold and
stick neck tag back on itself 
2. Snap neck tie, put apron 
on; ensure hood of 
coverall is outside
3. Put on surgical hat 
(and secure)
4. Put on face mask with 
crossed straps and mould
nose clip
12. Ready to enter clinical area
7. Put on inner gloves underneath 
cuff of coverall
5. Put on visor, adjust to fit
11. Buddy writes your name and role 
on your apron
10. Buddy – buddy check of PPE 
9. Put on long outer gloves 
covering cuff of coverall
8. Put elasticated loop over back of 
hand and over middle finger
6. Pull hood of coverall up 
then pull up zip on coverall
as far as comfort allows
− In good health – temperature check!!!!
− Ensure adequately hydrated
− Sign in at Control Point (CP)
− Start dress s tate scrubs and boots
− Remove jewellery
− Flat pony tail for long hair
− Cover minor cuts/insect bites
− Gather all PPE items, ensure required size and 
check integrity
OP gritrock donning procedures
Steps to dressing to be conducted in designated clean area 
Pre-donning procedure – things to
do before entry:  
Figure 1. Donning steps conducted in a buddyebuddy system. PPE, personal protective equipment.
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(Check each other for visible gross contamination and communicate)  
1. Step on rubber disinfection mat and scrape soles of boots on mat.
2. Step into 0.5% chlorine bath and agitate (use long handled brush to clean  
off any gross contamination)
3. Step out of chlorine bath and move to doffing buddy 1 and 2 (adjacent to  
0.5% chlorine tap)
4. Wash gloved hands in
0.5% chlorine; clean tap 
by rinsing with chlorine 
before turning off
9. Both facing same side; Buddy 2 pulls hood of coverall 
away from visor on Buddy 1, and then rolls hood back so 
the hood is inside-out. Both turn to face opposite side.    
Buddy 1 repeats the process for buddy 2
8. Wash gloved   
hands in 0.5% 
chlorine; clean tap 
by rinsing with 
chlorine before 
turning off
15. Remove coverall rolling down so outside of suit is contained inwards. Use hands to roll down suit over heels of  
boots and then sit, remove and step out of suit. 
16. Pick up suit from inside and dispose, holding suit at arms’ length so not to contaminate scrubs.  
20. Remove face mask; lean forward and close eyes, use one hand to grasp by the filter and pull 
firmly forwards and away from face. (If wearing glasses use fingers to pull straps away from  
glasses frame taking care not to touch face). Discard face mask.
25 Wash hands in
0.05%. Clean tap
by rinsing with
chlorine before 
turning off. 
23. Remove inner gloves using same technique as Step 5 
21. Remove surgical hat by grasping at top of head and discard.
26. Step on rubber disinfection mat and scrape soles of boots on mat. 
Step out of chlorine bath, PPE monitor spray boots and exit 
14. Both wash  
gloved hands in  
0.5% chlorine; 
clean tap by rinsing 
with chlorine 
before turning off
19. Wash gloved   
hands in 0.5% 
chlorine; take care 
not to wash skin. 
Clean tap by 
rinsing with 
chlorine before  
turning off
17. Wash gloved   
hands in 0.5% 
chlorine; clean tap 
by rinsing with 
chlorine before 
turning off
10. Both buddies  
wash gloved hands in   
0.5% chlorine; clean 
tap by rinsing with 
chlorine before 
turning off
6. Wash gloved 
hands in 0.5% 
chlorine; clean tap 
by rinsing with 
chlorine before 
turning off
7. Remove outer gloves to minimize contamination of other PPE; for example - pinch first glove and pull over thumb, then use ‘clean’ thumb to  
pull down cuff of second glove and remove both gloves inside out and discard
5. Remove apron without touching coverall. Grip the chest area of the apron and pull away from chest to tear neck loop.   
Allow apron top to drop down in front of lap.  Grasp apron over hips and pull forward to tear waist tie. Avoid touching the   
front of the apron, remove completely, folding apron in on itself, and place in bin.
22. Wash gloved   
hands in 0.5% 
chlorine; take care 
not to wash skin. 
Clean tap by 
rinsing with 
chlorine before 
turning off
18. Close eyes, remove visor; lean forward, grip side adjustments and lift off head.  
Immerse visor gently in 0.5% chlorine detergent
11. Facing each other: At arms’ length, buddy 1 holds back adhesive zip flap on buddy 2’s coverall and fully  
unzips suit; then buddy 2 holds back adhesive zip flap on buddy 1’s coverall and fully unzips suit.
12. At arms’ length: Both buddies face the same side (e.g. left). Buddy 1 helps remove buddy 2’s coveralls, by   
pinching coverall at the shoulder and gently pulling down suit from the shoulder, as buddy 2 leans forward,  
pulls out arms from suit  and steps forward.
13. At arms’ length: Both buddies turn around carefully and both face other side (right).  Buddy 2 helps remove  
buddy 1’s coveralls, by pinching coverall at the shoulder and gently pulling down suit from the shoulder, as 
buddy 1 leans forward,  pulls out arms from suit  and steps forward. OP
gritrock
ppe
doffing
procedures
Figure 2. Doffing steps were always under the instruction of personal protective equipment (PPE) monitors. The mask shape made it easy to get a safe secure grip on the front for
doffing, thereby avoiding contamination of the hair with either Ebola or bleach. Personnel pinched the top front of the apron after washing hands to tear the apron off safely; this
area was least contaminated. Hands were washed afterwards.
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itary and ambulance hazardous area response teams for a
number of years, and were adapted to fit the chosen PPE.
Between removal of each item of PPE, the wearer was required
to decontaminate their hands with hypochlorite solution
(5000 ppm) to prevent recontamination of PPE.
Training and monitoring
Training was delivered in a graduatedmanner in linewithMoD
practices; this aided familiarity for the personnel, allowed them
to understand the process and adopt it safely [12], and under-
stand the evidence base behind the equipment. Following the
formal presentation, personnel were shown videos demon-
strating the donning and doffing protocols which had been filmed
with MoD personnel under the guidance of subject matter ex-
perts. This promoted familiarity with the techniques prior to
personnel undertaking hands-on training. Participants were split
into small groups with instructors to practice and clarify key
points. The training culminated in a simulated ETU environment
in which personnel used PPE protocols whilst treating mock pa-
tients: ultraviolet tracer dye was used to simulate bodily fluids
contaminated with the Ebola virus. During this exercise, the
personnel were monitored by experts from the contributing
agencies using closed-circuit television and body-mapping tech-
niques to identify contamination of PPE and the ward area,
demonstrating the effectiveness of cleaning and doffing pro-
tocols, and providing further support for validation of PPE and
protocols. Of 312 body-mapping procedures recorded after
removal of PPE and decontamination, there were only four in-
stances of contamination; these were restricted to the soles of
rubber boots [13]. This was eliminated by modification of the
cleaning/decontamination of boots.
Refresher training was given to staff in situ and at regular
intervals to ensure that they were confident and competent
with the protocols once in West Africa. This continued in order
to maintain competence until the outbreak was declared over
and the facility closed down.
MoD Kerry Town ETU
The ETU concept and doctrine that was developed was
designed to offer up to high-dependency level care for HCWs in
a resource-limited West African setting. It was well resourced
with medical and nursing staff, with a nurse:patient ratio of
1:1e1:2 depending on occupancy levels. For each 60-day clin-
ical deployment period, up to 50 HCWs provided clinical care in
the red zone. The initial 12 beds (later increased to 20-bed
capacity) provided a suspected EVD area, with four single-
occupancy rooms with dedicated individual toilets. There was
no cohorting of suspected EVD patients and no cases of noso-
comial transmission to suspected EVD patients. The tents and
surrounding areas had closed-circuit television to allow remote
monitoring of staff and patients, and were temperature
controlled.
Results
The PPE solution described for the MoD-led ETU at Kerry
Town was used by personnel deployed with the 22nd Field
Hospital as part of Operation GRITROCK between November2014 and June 2015. A large number of personnel used PPE, and
the combination of equipment chosen could be adapted to fit
all the deploying personnel.
Lamb et al. [6] summarized how the MoD considered Oper-
ation GRITROCK to be a success due to ‘excellent clinical care,
validated through the WHO [World Health Organization]
inspection.and a far lower than expected EVD infection rate
among HCWs’. Medical workers were protected by the combi-
nation of PPE, donning and doffing procedures, and working
practices used within the facility. The conditions within the
facility were harsh; temperatures and humidity were high, the
facility was constructed rapidly with materials available
locally, and these factors had implications for the use of PPE in
this clinical setting.
Temperatures in Sierra Leone typically reached 31 C, which
caused people wearing PPE to perspire heavily. Some batches
of gloves degraded on contact with perspiration, visibility
could be reduced by condensation on the visors, and sweat
could pool in the rubber boots. This was managed by limiting
the amount of time that staff spent in the red zone to a
maximum of 2 h. There was a protocol for heat stress and
emergencies in the red zone, allowing safe extraction of staff
should the need arise.
The quality of PPE was monitored and any failures were
managed using a formal reporting mechanism. Issues with
insufficient thickness of aprons, delamination of visor screens,
perspiration-sensitive gloves and variability between batches
of coveralls were identified and addressed in this way. Faulty
batches of PPE were disposed of and replacements were
sourced quickly.
Observedbreaches in PPE included rips in coveralls causedby
catching on door handles or rubbing against rough wooden bal-
ustrades. This was mitigated by removing door handles where
possible, and wrapping the balustrades in cushioned material.
Other breaches in PPE included the coverall hoods or headwear
slipping off within the red zone. The headwear protected the
user from chlorine dripping off the tent flaps, and contact from
patients who occasionally patted medical staff on the head as
they leant over. If the headwear was displaced, the wearer
proceeded to the doffing station immediately, but the risk of
contracting Ebola from this was considered low and so did not
result in quarantining of the individual.
PPE was designed to protect the wearer primarily from in-
fectious risks, but also from the high concentrations of hypo-
chlorite used. These levels caused the re-usable PPE (boots and
visors) to disintegrate and glaze/delaminate, respectively.
Rinsing in fresh water and wiping followed by air drying helped
to reduce the degradation of this equipment. During the
deployment, one individual contracted EVD via an unknown
route. As discussed in the paper by Lamb et al. [6]: ‘a case re-
view of the events leading up to this case could find no obvious
problemwith their PPE use, but as a precaution the duration any
HCW could remain in the red zone was reduced to 90 minutes’.
Furthermore, two individuals undertook precautionary med-
ical evacuation following needlestick incidents which, when
investigated, were not attributed to a failure in PPE. PPEwas not
designed to protect the wearer from sharps, and therefore strict
protocols were used to protect against this hazard.
The robust military management style helped to ensure that
donning and doffing drills were followed accurately and
consistently. This was further enforced by the role of PPE
monitors who ensured that the doffing area was well managed,
P. Reidy et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 96 (2017) 42e4848and instructed and observed each person through the doffing
procedure and checked for any breaches in PPE. During the
deployment, small, authorized changes were made to the
protocols defined pre-deployment in order to speed up the
doffing process whilst not compromising IPC, and the protocols
described here are those used and tested in Sierra Leone.
Discussion
Developing a PPE solution for those deploying to the ETU
was a critical stage in the UK MoD response because PPE, pro-
tocols and the use of disinfectant were the major infection
prevention controls. The personnel who would be manning the
treatment centre had to be assured and confident in the se-
lection of equipment and the training provided as the situation
facing them was unique and not comparable to other military
deployments. The use of ultraviolet tracer during training
revealed no cross-contamination, unlike recent reports by
Casanova et al. [4] and Tomas et al. [5] which suggested
ongoing contamination due to incorrect doffing procedures.
A range of subject matter experts, including experienced
emergency responders, and clinical, scientific, laboratory and
military staff, worked together to develop and deliver an
intense nine-day training course that encompassed the pre-
dicted environment that would be faced during deployment.
When transferred to the field environment, initial training
could then be supplemented and any issues faced fed back to
the UK team, allowing for amendments to be made to protocols
if required. This continuous feedback loop ensured that the
most up-to-date protocols were used for training, and provided
a quality control aspect.
The PPE solution chosen was robust and implemented suc-
cessfully within the ETU in Sierra Leone. However, limitations
in the PPE selected have been described, and the authors
would lobby for further improvements in PPE design. Such
improvements would lead to decreased heat stress for the user
and a more simple doffing solution, whilst not compromising
infection control methods and maintaining protection from
direct and indirect contamination.
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